CREATING A COMMON EUROPEAN FUTURE: INTEGRATION OF YOUNG MIGRANTS IN EUROPE

A report investigating the practices of the European Integration Fund in four Member States

FutureLab Europe, April 2015
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This study by FutureLab Europe comes at a crucial moment in the shaping of European policy on migration. In line with the strategic priorities set forth by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the Commission will present the European Agenda on Migration in the first half of 2015. This Agenda will guide the Union’s actions in the coming years and link it with EU actions in other areas such as employment, education, social affairs and external action.

Migration policy lies at the core of European integration. An efficient migration policy is about social cohesion, protecting people in need and ensuring legal ways for them to enter Europe. A well-managed policy on legal migration is essential for Europe’s economy as we need the skills and talent to support continued growth. For migrants to be able to fully contribute to our societies, effective integration measures are key. Integration is only successful if we manage to build welcoming communities wherein migrants from outside of Europe can fully participate, and on the same basis as EU citizens.

While member states remain primarily responsible for integration policies, the EU’s legal framework includes some provisions on integration measures such as granting migrants a minimum level of rights. The EU’s role is also to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and best practices between the member states and promote a dialogue with stakeholders. The EU has significantly contributed to the development of national integration measures through the European Fund for the Integration of third country nationals and will continue doing so under the new Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund.

FutureLab researchers have shed light on the direct link between policy priorities and their concrete results. They have also brought the voice of migrants at the heart of the debate. The great added value of this research is that the voice of direct beneficiaries is heard in the policy debate.

A lot has been achieved over the past years and yet many challenges remain: comparatively high unemployment levels of migrants, gaps in educational achievement, higher risks of poverty and social exclusion, geographical and socio-economic segregation. Many improvements still need to be made in the area of migrants’ political rights and their path towards citizenship, which has a direct link to their social and economic integration and welfare. We must build on the positive outcomes achieved so far, and continue investing EU funds towards the greater goal of migrants’ integration.

Matthias Ruete

Matthias Ruete is Director General of the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission.
The main purpose of this report is to assess the integration of migrants in the EU by investigating the practice of the European Integration Fund (EIF) in four EU member states: Finland, Germany, Romania, and Spain, virtually covering Northern, Continental, Eastern and Southern Europe.

The study is the result of a qualitative research based on the findings that emerged from 10 interviews with NGOs based in the case study countries and co-financed by the EIF, and a questionnaire filled out by 125 migrants who took part in EIF-funded programmes. The aforementioned methodology was chosen to create a bridge between the people on the ground and EU policy makers, giving a voice to the people directly involved in EU-funded programmes as well as to the migrants themselves.

The questionnaire highlighted that a large number of migrants experienced discrimination in all the case study countries. Migrants put a very high emphasis on language, stressing that it is the most important factor for integration and called for a higher involvement of local NGOs and host societies to promote successful integration. In general, the programmes benefited from good communication in the four focus countries, over two-thirds of the respondents thought that the EIF-funded programmes they took part in were easily accessible and over half of them knew that the programme was funded by the EU. NGOs generally lamented the lengthy and complicated bureaucratic procedures draining their already limited resources. They called for less stringent eligibility criteria for EIF-funded programmes so that they could include different types of migrants, including those without a regular resident permit, or foreign-born spouses or children who hold the citizenship of the host country and are therefore excluded from integration programmes.

On the basis of these findings, FutureLab Europe participants developed a number of policy recommendations to the EU, national and regional authorities and NGOs. The recommendations include:

To the EU:
- Strengthen the integration dimension of EU migration policy;
- Accompany integration measures with cooperation with third countries;
- Lessen the bureaucratic burden and make procedures more flexible;
- Create EU-wide projects fostering EU identity;
- Offer guidelines for the implementation of projects and favour language classes, schools and leisure activities;
- Reinforce the youth dimension.

To national and regional authorities:
- Expand the criteria for beneficiaries allowing migrants without residence permits and foreign-born spouses and children to participate in the programmes;
- Promote the involvement of the host society in integration efforts to bridge the gap between migrants and EU citizens.

To NGOs:
- Organise more culture and art projects to promote integration in a friendly setting;
- Involve migrants as project leaders to take advantage of their understanding of the culture of the country of origin and the host country in question;
- Exchange best practices with other NGOs to maximise efficiency.
INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, public discussions have flared up all over Europe about what it actually means to be European. The public debate quickly turned to the failure of migrant integration into the respective host societies and spread gradually to immigration policy. In such a context, and despite a myriad of positive examples, Europe’s capacity to advocate its values to the migrants’ community and to turn integration into a success story has become increasingly questioned in the public sphere.

Definitions of successful integration policies vary greatly across Europe. Different concepts have been at the core of two integration models developed among EU member states. The first one is the assimilation model, which is traditionally encountered in France. Inspired by the republican principle of equality, this model consists of a unilateral adaptation of the migrant to the host society’s culture, eventually leading to the migrants abandoning their origins. The second one is the multicultural model and it is characteristic to countries such as the UK and the Netherlands. Seen as a “celebration of diversity”, multiculturalism is a two-way process: the migrant adapts to the host society and the host society adapts to the migrant. This model is more flexible than the assimilation model as it allows migrants to maintain their cultural heritage.

The assimilationist model in France

“France is an open and tolerant place. However, there are many underlying tensions between and within certain communities that are not currently addressed. France’s integration policy is underpinned by secularism and it has led to such measures as the banning of headscarves and means that data on ethnic origins cannot be gathered. This gives the impression that all are treated equally, however, walking around the streets of Paris (or glancing at its boardrooms) it is clear that this is not the case. A large proportion of the population still maintain strong non-French identities and this remains intrinsically linked to your place in society, your job, your neighbourhood. It creates a de facto segregation. It leads me to ask how a country can deal with integration if being different does not exist? Where does that leave immigrants or those of immigrant origins in this society?”

Nathalie Straker, FutureLabber
These models should be understood as frames of reference resulting in various concrete measures, which vary significantly from one member state to another. This variety of measures also lies in the fact that migrant integration is a multi-faceted process requiring a complex set of actions touching upon a wide range of policies, such as education and employment, housing, urban planning as well as cultural and religious diversity.

The complexity and diversity of integration policies explain why it remains a national preserve in the European Union (EU). But this is not the only reason. Integration is often perceived as a very politically sensitive issue that domestic governments want to keep as their own. Furthermore, the topic of integration can easily lead to political polarisation and represents a means for policy makers to differentiate from each other at a time when so many issues are discussed or even decided beyond national borders.4

Notwithstanding, several tools have been developed at the EU level to provide support for the integration of migrants in the member states. Among them are the European Integration Forum,5 the Handbook on Integration,6 the European Website on Integration,7 and the European Integration Fund (EIF) of third country nationals.8 The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policies,9 to which the Council has reaffirmed its commitment in 2014, also have great potential in orienting national policies in this field, as they serve as the basis for shaping the national strategies for integration. Last but not least, the EU can intervene in this area via its non-discrimination policy and its competences in the area of employment and social affairs. But despite the usefulness of such EU tools, both their scope and impact are limited. Furthermore, EU tools in the field of integration policy often derive from other policy areas, instead of being created for their own purpose.

As a result, the integration of migrants has always been left behind in EU migration policy. While the EU has adopted an impressive number of legislative instruments when it comes to fighting irregular migration, external border control and asylum, its actions with respect to the integration of migrants is very limited. Indeed, while migration policy is a EU competence, integration is not. Thus, the responsibility for migrant integration lies with the national and regional authorities, whereas the EU is timidly striving to “pursue active integration policies which foster social cohesion and economic dynamism”.10

Against this background, one might wonder whether a genuine common immigration policy can be developed successfully (as required by the Lisbon Treaty – Article 79 TFUE) without a substantial integration component. And more importantly, if a stronger inclusion of integration components in EU migration policy could improve and facilitate the integration of migrants. These are the questions that the members of FutureLab Europe want to address in this publication, by looking into the role that EU integration tools play in the complex process of migrant integration in Europe. To this end, they give particular attention to the relevant EU financial instrument in this policy area, i.e. the European Integration Fund (EIF), and compare the initiatives put in practice thanks to this fund in four member states – Germany, Spain, Finland, and Romania – , giving the study a geographical balance. The pan-European approach also enables the authors to compare the implementation of EIF programmes across several member states, to identify good practice examples and assess how they could be applied in other countries, and finally, to evaluate the major drawbacks of such programmes.

5 Forum composed of civil society organisations gathered in order to discuss migrant integration issues.
6 Handbook on integration for policy makers and practitioners, 3rd edition (2010) provides a framework for the exchange of information and developing more efficient integration policies.
7 The European Website on Integration provides a series of good practices and tools related to integration practices at EU and national level.
8 For the period 2014-2020, the home affairs budget (€ 6,901 million) will be split in two funds: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF).
9 Set of 11 common principlesAdopted in 2004, the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policies form the foundations of EU initiatives in the field of integration and aim to provide a reference framework to the member states. However, none of these principles are legally binding.
10 European Council Conclusions, 26-27 June 2014, Brussels.
This study is a qualitative analysis, as evidence has been collected through two main channels: a series of interviews with NGOs, which are partly financed by the EIF, and a questionnaire sent to migrants who benefited from EIF-funded programmes. Choosing this methodology allowed the authors to give a voice to people who are directly involved in EU-funded programmes as well as to the migrants themselves. Lastly, the study also puts a strong focus on the young generation. There are two main reasons for this choice: firstly, the migrant community is by and large composed of young people. Data collected by Eurostat in 2012 shows that the median age of third country migrants living in the EU was 35. Secondly, research has shown that young migrants require special attention as they are at greater risk of being faced with poverty and social exclusion, making integration measures targeting this age group even more important. Furthermore, a lasting and successful integration is best achieved when started at a younger age, so that children and young adults can feel like an integral part of society. It is also in Europe’s economic interest to integrate migrants at an early age so that they are well equipped to provide a valuable contribution to the labour market.

This publication is divided into three main chapters. In the first one, the authors describe the climate in which integration and migration policies are taking place today. The second chapter presents the results of the four case studies and follows a two-stage approach. First, it sets the scene in the four case study countries by highlighting migration trends and their evolution over the past decades and by describing some of the major features of the on-going debate at the domestic level. The second chapter also includes a presentation of the results of the interviews and responses to the questionnaire. Based on these findings, the authors then formulate policy recommendations for the different relevant stakeholders in the third chapter, while also expressing their views on how the role of the EU could be improved in the realm of migrant integration. Finally, the conclusion suggests some possible policy actions for the near future.

11 The questionnaire is available for downloads at the address: http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/downloads.html
12 In comparison, the median age of European nationals was 43.
CHAPTER 1
A DETERIORATING CLIMATE FOR MIGRANTS’ INTEGRATION

"We came to Europe with love and peace. We are full of experiences, hope and love. Help us to be good citizens."

A survey respondent from Egypt living in Romania.

The climate in which migration and integration policies are currently developing is becoming extremely threatening for migrants, as it is characterised by a continually degenerating economic situation, a tensed social climate, a stronger polarisation of the political discourse with extremist messages resonating with more and more people, and stricter requirements on migrants.

**A deteriorating economic environment and social climate...**

Several events have contributed to making the topic of migrant integration a hotly debated issue: First, the economic crisis and its harsh consequences on a range of determinants of citizens’ well-being, be it employment, access to quality public services, or the level of purchasing power, has had a direct impact on how immigration and integration are talked about. The difficult economic environment and its repercussions on people’s daily life have changed how migrants are perceived by the rest of the society.

The level of unemployment has been soaring for a couple of years, reaching unprecedented levels in most member states. The quality of and access to public services have also deteriorated due to the growing number of people relying on them and the increased pressure on public expenditure. In other words, more people have to make use of dwindling public services. In this context, the discourse of radical political parties has gained ground and the perception of migrants’ contribution to our societies, and in particular to our economies, has altered. Instead of being seen as a possible contributors to economic wealth, they are increasingly perceived as a burden on the job market and the public purse.

**Foreigners in their own country**

“A lot of migrants in Denmark have not achieved everything they hoped for. Some have had to take a job far below their level of education, or go without a job at all; non-western immigrants have an employment rate that is 38% lower than the regular Dane. Many immigrants also experience the daily struggles of feeling or being perceived as a “foreigner” in the country that they live in, and might have lived in almost all their life”.

Anna Harpviken, FutureLabber
Second, recent terrorist attacks in Europe, as well as the radicalisation of some young people, have pushed a simmering (and sometimes ignored) problem at the forefront of the public debate. These events have clearly reignited some social tensions and raised important questions such as: Where to draw the line between freedom of speech and respect for others? To what extent should the principle of secularism apply in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies? What measures should be implemented to counteract religious radicalisation? In this context and given the – still isolated – terrorist attacks, many people are now questioning the concept of multiculturalism and Europe’s capacity to deliver successfully on migrant integration.

All these debates, although already present in the past, have become more widespread and have been subtly nurtured by a more polarised political and public discourse.

...leading to stronger polarisation of the political discourse...

Due to the still ongoing economic crisis and because of the difficulty of coping with the consequences of a more globalised, complex and multicultural society, the political discourse on migration and integration has steadily polarised between those who believe that immigration is Europe’s biggest problem and those who argue that it is an invaluable asset for the continent’s future.

In this context, nationalist voices have become louder and xenophobic movements are emerging all across Europe. Recently, the German Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) gained publicity with their demand for a more restrictive immigration legislation and their Islamophobic attitude. Other European member states have faced similar events and trends, usually coupled with Eurosceptic political rhetoric and often specifically with anti-Muslim sentiment. For instance, Geert Wilders, the founder and leader of the fairly large Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, was charged for inciting hatred on the grounds of his anti-Muslim radicalism. While not all of these movements share the same values when it comes to economic and social issues, they share the desire to reduce immigration rates, to promote measures favouring nationals over migrants, and to remove competencies the EU acquired in this field.

The shift towards radicalisation is not only a phenomenon relying on some statements of isolated people or movements. It is also reflected in the new political landscape and the growing weight of extremist parties. For instance, Marine le Pen’s Front National has now become the second or third (depending on the elections) largest political party in France, while the Finns Party (previously called the True Finns) gained almost a fifth of the national votes in the last elections. These parties have also reinforced their political weight at the European level, as highlighted by the results of the last European Elections in May 2014.14 The European Parliament (EP) now counts 79 MEPs from the far-right, representing around 10.5% of the seats in the EP15

...and stricter requirements on migrants

This economic and political context has led to a series of integration policy developments that are especially burdensome for migrants.

For instance, there is an increasing preference for pre-departure or pre-entry integration measures, i.e. measures that migrants need to comply with before accessing the territory of their country of destination. Research shows that several member states, including the Netherlands, Germany, France, UK and Austria, have established pre-entry mandatory integration programmes.16 Although these programmes vary extensively in length and content, their common aim is to ensure that migrants have certain integration capacities before leaving their origin country.

Family reunification is another area in which some member states have adopted stricter conditions. According to the latest Migrant Integration Policy Index17 III (MIPEX) (2011), procedures for family reunification have become less favourable in 11 countries since 2007.18 For example, while some member states demand higher marriage ages (UK), others ask for higher incomes for sponsors (Austria). Some member states also introduced more

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15 Based on the authors’ own calculation.
17 Thomas Huddleston, Jan Niessen with Eadaoin Ni Chaoimh and Emilie White, Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX III), 2011.
18 MIPEX research is conducted in 31 countries: EU17 (2011), Canada, Norway, Switzerland and the United States.
linguistic and cultural integration tests for the spouses (Austria, Germany, France, and Denmark). Although these tests imply higher fees, there is very little financial support for the third country nationals.

Interestingly, there have been no major policy modifications related to the conditions of the delivery of long term residence permits. These rules have mostly been adopted in 2006 and 2007, after the adoption of the EU Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residence and generally remained unchanged. Nevertheless, MIPEX III shows that some countries find new reasons for rejection and withdrawal of the long-term residence permit such as: point systems (UK, Denmark, Italy), vague security grounds (Switzerland) and double punishment (UK).

Selective criteria

«The first immigrants coming to Denmark were invited to work, as the industrial sector was short on staff. Generally speaking, the government wants migrants capable of working and/or being educated. Another criterion is that immigrants are easy to integrate. These criteria are not officially a policy, but are reflected in different measures that are taken when considering who gets a Danish passport. For example, a comprehensive test of Danish language and culture is required for all asylum seekers before granting the Danish citizenship. As a result, most people who fulfil the criteria are western immigrants».

Anna Harpviken, FutureLabber

CHAPTER 2

After World War II, Europe became a pole of attraction for many people who were leaving their country of origin to escape from war, to find a job or simply to seek a better life. The continent experienced migration fluxes, with Europeans moving from one country to another and with non-European people migrating to Europe from other regions of the world. Migration fluxes affected EU countries differently: while some states have been the chosen destination of migrants since the 1950s, others started welcoming foreign citizens only in recent years; some countries are net importers of migrants, some others are net exporters. Inevitably, these differences affect integration practices, define the scale of integration policies and the attention that each country devotes to the migrants living in their society.

The analysis of migration and integration practices in Germany, Finland, Romania and Spain portrays a comprehensive picture of four different EU countries receiving different shares of the European Integration Fund while having to deal with different background conditions.
Finland started receiving the first large influxes of immigrants in the 1970s and has been, since then, a net importer of migrants. Migration and integration are highly debated topics and the Finnish government’s policy is actively seeking to treat migrants as active subjects and participants rather than the passive objects of services.

Unlike most other ‘old’ member states Finland does not have a long tradition of immigration. On the contrary, for most of Finland’s history, people have been leaving the country and moved abroad – predominantly to Sweden – due to better job opportunities. When Finland gained its independence in 1917, there were a few immigrants from Russia who were escaping the revolution, but it was only after the 1970s that Finland experienced a larger influx of immigrants, first in the form of refugees, then in the form of labour migration. After the initiative of President Mauno Koivisto in 1990, Finland witnessed a rise of Ingrian Finns, the Finnish population of Ingria, who were forced to relocate to different parts of the Soviet Union during the Second World War and who got the right to move back to Finland. The number of immigrants in 2013 (31,941) has nearly tripled in comparison to 1990 (13,588) and Statistics Finland describes immigration to Finland as a phenomenon of the 21st century. In 2013 the net migration stock of Finland was positive, as the number of emigrants stood at 13,890.

At the moment, the largest third-country immigrant communities in Finland are Russian, Somali, Chinese, Thai, Iraqi, Indian and Turkish and make up 3.8% of the entire Finnish population. That’s 207,511 people who held a foreign nationality (including EU-passports) in 2013. Last year, the Immigration Services received 22,076 applications for residence permits for family reunification, study or work-related reasons, 17,995 (81.5%) of which it approved. With respect to asylum requests, they only accepted 36.9% (3,651 out of 3,651) in addition to the 1,030 people covered by the refugee quota. It is particularly noteworthy to realise that most immigrants arrive in Finland at an
age when they could start a professional career and be active on the labour market: over 50% of immigrants who came to Finland in 2010 were aged between 20-34 and the Government Institute for Economic Research estimates that the average age of arriving immigrants is between 26-28 years old. In other words, most immigrants are young people, who could give a very valuable contribution to the national economy, if they were empowered to do so.

While Finland has experienced a substantial increase in immigrants over the past few years, Finland has less foreign nationals compared to other Nordic and Western European countries. Nevertheless, immigration, multiculturalism and racism have become predominant and controversial topics in the Finnish society and a survey carried out by TNS Gallup in 2013 demonstrates that the attitudes of Finns towards immigration have hardened. Over 52% of respondents think that immigration should be restricted as long as there is unemployment in Finland. In a similar survey conducted by the same institute in 2011, that figure stood at 45%.

This radicalisation can also be seen on the political front. The Finns Party, which advocates tougher immigration laws, calls for stricter rules on family reunification and supports the expulsion of immigrants who commit criminal offences, won a sweeping victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections, gaining 34 new parliamentary seats. A prominent member of this right-wing party, Jussi Halla-aho, – he received the second highest number of votes in the last European elections – recently criticised the party for not letting immigration issues feature more prominently in the campaign agenda as Finland prepares for general elections in spring 2015. The party leader, Timo Soini, asserts that immigration is primarily a financial burden for the Finnish economy because most immigrants allegedly rely on the welfare-system. According to Halla-aho, immigration is not merely an economic issue, it is also a social problem. Halla-Alo and many other party members claim that immigration leads to issues such as ghettoisation and poses a threat to internal security. In February 2015 the party published an immigration position paper that condemned the influx of immigrants and described multiculturalism as an artificial fabrication.

The popularity of the Finns Party is by no means the only evidence of the controversial nature of immigration in Finland. In fact their popularity has influenced the discourse of mainstream parties too. Last autumn the liberal conservative Member of Parliament (MP), Pia Kauma, stated that immigrants buy new perambulators with their social benefits, while Finnish families recycle their old ones. Her Party’s youth-wing – the Coalition Party Youth League – proposed the decriminalisation of incitement to ethnic or racial hatred. The rise of the Finns Party has significantly polarised the population on the topics of migration and integration, and has diminished the space for constructive dialogue. While negative stories dominate the mainstream media, there are also prominent figures who attempt to improve the situation of immigrants. For instance, Päivi Lipponen, an MP from the Social Democrats, asked for speeding up the process of granting residence permits.

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27 Anneli Miettinen, ‘Maahanmuuttajien määrä’, Familj Federation of Finland, available at http://www.vestolitto.fi/tietoja_tutkimus/vaestontutkimuslaitos/tiilastoja_ja_linkkeja/tiilastotietoa/maahanmuuttajat/maahanmuuttajien-maara/, last accessed on: 24.01.2015. The average number of foreign citizens living in EU countries is 6.8% but in Finland the number stood at 3.6% in 2002. It was the smallest figure out of all the so called old EU Member States. See STATISTICS FINLAND, ‘Ulkomaalaisuustaitstaisten määrä ylijäli 300 000 rajan’, 10 December 2014, available at http://www.stat.fi/tiili/vaerak/2013/02/vaerak_2013_02_2014-12-10_tie_001_fi.html, last accessed on: 31.01.2015.
30 The Finns Party was previously known as the True Finns and it is commonly known under this name in international media. It is a populist and nationalist party known for its tough stance on immigration policy.
32 Ibidem.
34 Pia Kauma is member of the National Coalition Party (Kokoomus).
36 Finnish Parliament, database of MPs’ interventions.
A different perspective on immigration from another Nordic country:

«In the summer of 2014 Sweden received 2000 refugees a week, while Finland got 2500 asylum requests from January to September. The biggest reason for this significant imbalance is that Sweden has vowed to grant permanent residency to all Syrian refugees. Three out of four Swedes support liberal immigration policy and think that Sweden should continue to accept the same amount of refugees as it does now. The same source indicates that the Swedes, among all EU member states, were the most positive about immigration. According to Marie Demker, professor of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, the reason for this positive attitude is that migration policies have "never been a controversial subject in Swedish politics, since Sweden has never had a nationalistic tradition".

Hanna Engblom, FutureLabber
The Interior Ministry of Finland, the authority responsible for integration, established a Migration Strategy in 2013, founded on the following principles: a) Finland is an open and safe country, b) everyone can find a role to play and c) diversity is part of everyday life. The current government recognises the importance of immigrants for its economy and sees it as a solution to Finland’s ageing demographic structure. The Migration Strategy of Finnish Interior Ministry focuses on employment questions and non-discrimination and it asserts that “migrant communities must be treated as active subjects and participants rather than objects of services and measures”.

Between 2007-2013 Finland’s main objectives with the EIF were to fund projects that increase the integration of immigrants through different means (arts, political awareness, and language courses), improve cross-cultural communication between civil servants and immigrants (administrative training) and create indicators that increase the capacity to evaluate integration policies (methodological assessment). Immigrants in the most vulnerable positions, such as women, youth, children and disabled people, have been a priority. In total, the budget of the EIF for Finland was €10,054,949, which allowed the funding of about 15 projects per year between 2007 and 2013. The state of Finland contributed €2,010,990 while private funds added €502,747. In total, the sum Finland received from the EIF was 0.93% of the fund’s overall budget.

“Through the project, young immigrants feel that they are an important part of the society. It gave a lot of support and motivation to young people”. Another added: “Project supplied me with leadership and organisational skills. It also boosted my expertise.”

A survey respondent living in Finland

INTERVIEWS AND SURVEY RESULTS

Number of survey respondents 18
Number of interviews with NGOs 3

General observations
- The majority of respondents were satisfied with the results of the projects;
- One respondent noted that the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine has prevented some Russian immigrants from attending a project. The Russian immigrants are concerned that others might criticise them for the situation and are therefore reluctant to take part in the projects. They also noticed a rise in anti-Russia sentiments;
- Many respondents felt that the projects were understaffed and therefore not realised to their full potential;
- Both NGOs and respondents noted that it is difficult to bridge the distance between NGOs and migrants for multiple reasons, but primarily because immigrants are vulnerable to social exclusion. Thus, it is difficult to inform them about the projects;
- Respondents felt that the projects empower young immigrants and gives them tools for political participation;
- The majority of respondents stated that the EU should take a stronger lead in supporting member states in their effort to integrate immigrants into the host society. At the same time, one NGO recognised that national sovereignty prevents the EU from taking further actions. It was also understood that deeper European integration is required to reinforce the EU’s role in helping immigrants to integrate.

Integration in the Host Society
- Half of the respondents or their relatives have experienced discrimination;
- An overwhelming majority of respondents recognise themselves as EU citizens and share the EU’s values. However, three persons completely disagreed with the statement “I’m an EU-citizen”;
- Most respondents felt that the current economic crisis has hindered their lives, in particular in terms of access to employment. Also, they felt that their interests are not represented in the political sphere;
- While a large number of respondents felt that they were part of the society where they live, a few expressed hesitance about the feeling of belonging;

• All but two people felt that the EU has a responsibility to support the integration of immigrants.
• According to the respondents, language is the most pressing matter for integration. At the same time, several respondents mentioned that unconventional methods, such as art projects, could better support integration as opposed to the focus on linguistic or civic training alone.
• Most respondents indicated that the following actions would improve integration: better advertising of existing initiatives/programmes; investing in programmes that promote a more tolerant and inclusive society; financing local NGOs that have direct contact with migrants; and having more EU top-level officials with migration backgrounds.

Knowledge about the EU programmes and impact on EU identity
• Most respondents knew that the programmes were funded by the EU;
• Nearly all respondents thought that the projects were easily accessible;
• Apart from one person, all participants were able to name the project;
• One NGO highlighted that programmes where young migrants can meet with people from other parts of the EU are a key driver for fostering a European identity. They help young migrants realise that there are people all over Europe who have experienced similar feelings, experiences and challenges. They forge a sense of common belonging.
• One NGO emphasised that the EU should support young immigrants, in particular those with few opportunities, to go for exchanges or internships in another EU member state. Europe is a distant issue for young immigrants, but through participating in an EU-project, Europe becomes more concrete. Too many programmes under Erasmus • require an extensive amount of skills, knowledge and administrative know-how, which is preventing young people with a migration background from applying.

Procedures
• NGOs complained about the separation of the Refugee and Integration Fund,\(^39\) which made the work of NGOs very complicated. They indeed had to ask whether participants are migrants or refugees in order to decide whether they can be covered by the programme. Asking such personal questions can be very unpleasant for migrants and is likely to undermine the relationship of trust between participants and the NGO. Therefore, NGOs warmly welcome the fact that the two funds are now combined;
• NGOs felt that the funding procedure was sometimes too bureaucratic, especially with respect to the reporting, which requires a lot of resources. They also indicated that questions are often repetitive;
• NGOs look forward to the new funding mechanism, but still want more funding to be allocated to integration programmes. The same concern is evident in the answers of respondents who felt that some aspects of the projects could not be properly carried out. Additional money would help a lot and allow the employment of additional staff;
• Some NGOs also wished that some projects could be entirely financed with funds from the EIF, instead of having to rely on a co-funding mechanism. This would be a great help to grassroots organisations that have weaker institutional structures, but more direct contacts with migrants.

\(^39\) The EIF ran during the period 2007-13, supporting national and EU initiatives that facilitate the integration of non-EU immigrants into European societies. For the period 2014-2020 the EU set up a new funding instrument: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) that will now promote the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Union approach to asylum and immigration.
Unlike Finland, Germany has been a destination country for migrants since the 1950s, becoming one of the countries with the longest immigration tradition in the EU. Despite the large number of immigrants it received during the last 60 years, it can be argued that Germany failed to devise a successful integration strategy and in recent years, German public debate strongly focused on the lack of integration of migrants.

**GERMANY**

In the first years of the newly founded German Federal Republic (GFR), it was mainly economic demand that influenced German migration policy. In the 1950s, Germany’s booming economy required more workers than were available. The German government made a contract with Italy to get Italian workers to come to Germany and thus meet the labour demand. The so-called Gastarbeiter (guest-workers) were supposed to be – as the term already implies – a short-term solution to the labour shortage. They primarily were employed in the industrial sector, doing manual labour. Throughout the late 50s and early 60s, more contracts were set up with Turkey, Morocco, Portugal and Yugoslavia, bringing even more Gastarbeiter to Germany. The arrival of the one millionth Gastarbeiter in 1964 was celebrated by the media and the government, which gave him a motorcycle as a welcoming present.40

The oil crisis in 1973 disrupted the German economy, which meant that the German industry needed fewer workers. As a consequence, the German government established a ban on the recruitment of more migrant workers. In the following years, the number of Gastarbeiter steadily declined. Nevertheless, it became apparent that the intended short-term solution of inviting people to Germany in order to respond to labour shortages turned into a long-term situation: Gastarbeiter stayed for far longer than just a few months or years; their families joined them and they settled down permanently.

Since the late 70s, the topic of migration became increasingly politicised and policy-makers tried to improve the legal regulation of migration. However, most law-making initiatives failed. A department dedicated to the integration of foreigners was established in 1978. The office was first held by Heinz Kühn (SPD), who tried to introduce a memorandum to make the government come to terms with the current migration situation in Germany and adopt a more sustainable integration policy. But his plan largely failed to materialise.

When the Iron Curtain fell in 1990, the number of migrants increased rapidly due to the political situation at the time, i.e. the war in Yugoslavia and the persecution of Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. In the early 90s migrants were under increasing popular scrutiny. Many of them were spatially and socially isolated; they lived in close-knit communities that were often located in suburbs, where cheap housing and accommodation for refugees was available. Most of the migrants’ children grew up separated from the rest of the society and went to school in districts where only migrants lived. Acceptance into German society and the acquisition of language skills especially was therefore very difficult.

After the surge of migration in the early 90s, the German population debated the rightfulness of asylum seekers’ motives for seeking refuge in Germany. The increasing hostility towards migrants led to several bloody assaults and arson attacks on asylum seekers and their houses. As a reaction to the population’s fears, the controversial Asylum-compromise was introduced in 1993. It limited the possibilities of receiving asylum in Germany, as criteria were tightened and new, stricter definitions of what constitutes “political persecution” and a “secure country” were introduced. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and many NGOs heavily criticised this legislation.

In 2005, the new government coalition of CDU and SPD agreed on a new legal regulation of migration and emphasised the importance of political action in this field: The keyword was “integration”, meaning that public policies should go further.

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than the mere granting of citizenship. The target group were not only people with a foreign passport, but also German citizens with a migration background, i.e. all those who had migrated to Germany after 1950 and their descendants, even those who had gained German citizenship. This new terminology made it possible to include people with a migration background in integration policies, but it also implied that the group described as “Germans with migration background” is still considered to be different.

In 2013, the Federal Statistical Office stated that 19.8% of the 80.611 million people living in Germany have a migration background, while 8.5% of the total population have no German passport. The Federal Statistical Office also registered 1,226,493 third-country citizens arriving in Germany, and only 797,886 emigrating from Germany in 2013, amounting to a positive net migration balance of 428,607, showing that migration is an important long-term demographic growth factor for Germany. The latest census from 2013 indicated that the majority of non-EU migrant communities come from Turkey (17.6%), the Russian Federation (7.5%) and Kazakhstan (5.7%).

In recent years, the public debate has focused on the lack of integration of migrants. Part of the German population fears the development of so-called “parallel societies” by migrant communities. Others think that migrants are stealing their jobs or consider asylum seekers to be a burden on the German social systems and an internal security risk. Recently, some of those people voiced their discontent by joining the demonstrations organised by the Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West). Their demonstrations – gathering ten thousand participants – got worldwide media coverage in January 2015. As a response, some national media and politicians try to objectify the highly emotional discussion by debunking the myths and prejudices; they reiterate the arguments of the 2014 study conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation revealing that German society and the country’s social system are benefitting greatly from migrants. Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasised that “Islam is part of Germany.” Many German cities also witnessed anti-Pegida and pro-diversity demonstrations, which by far outnumbered the anti-Islam protests. That being said, it is important to highlight that the number of violent attacks on asylum seekers and their houses have more than doubled since 2012.

42 Ibidem.
43 DESTATIS, Migration between Germany and foreign countries 1991 to 2013, last ahttps://www.destatis.de/DE/Statistiken/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/MigrationshintergrundTaetler/ MigrationshintergrundStaatsangehoerigkeit.html, last accessed on: 31.01.2015.
45 Pegida is an anti-Islamic movement which emerged in Dresden.
48 “Record numbers of anti-PEGIDA protesters in Germany”, Deutsche Welle, 13 January 2015, available at http://dw.de/p/1EJEs, last ahttp://dw.de/p/1EJEs accessed on: 31.01.2015.
Between 2007 and 2013, Germany received €84,295,476 from the EIF. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Germany is the organ in charge for the implementation of the EIF. 75% of its budget comes from the EIF and 25% from national co-funding. The projects funded by the EIF focused on migrants from non-EU countries who either already received a residence permit or are under suspension of deportation for at least a year. The main objective of the German NGOs funded by the EIF was to improve the integration of migrants via education, especially through language courses. Other measures included the support of female migrants, families and the advancement of intercultural dialogue. The national and regional projects conducted by NGOs thus aim to integrate migrants by enabling them to actively participate in German society. The German government also dedicated parts of the EIF to the evaluation of ongoing measures and to the monitoring of the development and successes of integration policies.

INTERVIEWS AND SURVEY RESULTS

Number of survey respondents 22
Number of interviews with NGOs 3

General Observations
• The survey results revealed that 25% of the respondents are second generation migrants and 35% are third generation migrants. The feeling of being a migrant in society increases the more recent the generation is (28.6% of third generation migrants, 60% of second and 62.5% of first generation migrants);
• The limited time of the projects were considered a weakness by the respondents;

Fortress Mentality
«The French policy on immigration, as that of many of its neighbours, can be best described as a fortress mentality. Talk of an “EU blue card” - based on the US green card -, or other equivalent schemes to attract highly skilled workers has been silenced. Attracting migrants is not a priority. On the contrary, the numbers of migrants that are being expelled is increasing. Certain groups, like the Roma gypsies, are targeted. A more astounding policy of expulsion has also occurred, with the revocation of French citizenship for returning jihadists».

Nathalie Straker, FutureLabber

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52 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Germany, Information on the European Integration Fund.
Two NGOs think that the focus of the projects should be more on the host society's structures and cooperation among institutions working in the field of integration;

The interviewees pointed out that it is very important to have a functioning network between NGOs and organisations that can be implemented on a local level, be it in the church, the city, or in schools. One of the NGOs indicated that local structures are sometimes too closed-up and need to make an effort to open up to NGOs.

Integration in the Host Society

Half of the respondents consider being fluent in German a strong integrating factor and 30% see education as the strongest integration tool. This has also been taken up as priorities by the German NGOs funded by the EIF;

Although 20% of the survey respondents still experience verbal harassment and 35% would consider going back to their home country, 57.1% feel integrated in their host society and 50% identify with the EU's values;

In order to facilitate the integration process of migrants, survey participants recommended the following measures: developing a positive discourse about what migrants bring to the host society; financing local NGOs that are in direct contact with migrants and are more aware of local problems; and making sure that more people of different ethnicities are hired in EU leading positions;

According to many respondents, more should be done to ensure the recognition of diplomas and/or professional qualifications in order to facilitate the integration in the labour market. Furthermore, they insisted that integration projects rarely offer leisure activities;

Having NGO project leaders who are migrants themselves and share the same culture as the projects' beneficiaries can be a significant advantage and maximise the success of the integration initiatives. Project leaders with a migrant background have a better understanding of the situation the project participants are in and an exchange about the culture of the home and of the host country is made possible;

One of the interviewed NGOs, which is in contact with people interested in migrating to Germany, highlighted the success of pre-integration measures and the partnership with agencies located in the home countries. It allows future migrants to get valid information about rights and duties in the host country as well as the political, educational and labour system, before their departure. It helps them not to have too high expectations and to prepare their integration process in advance.

Knowledge about the EU programmes and impact on EU identity

75% of the survey participants said that the programmes were easily accessible;

Only 37.5% of the respondents could recall the name of the programme they were involved in and 62.5% did not know that the programme was financed by the EU.

Procedures

Two NGOs revealed that checking the attendance of third-country nationals in projects by inspecting their residence permits (measures introduced by Germany) scared a lot of programme participants and was generally perceived as being counter-productive in establishing mutual trust between NGO workers and migrants;

The NGOs stipulated that writing detailed reports and responding to the various requirements of the EU in order to receive the EIF money creates a lot of bureaucracy and does not correspond with the administrative capacity of many NGOs. Furthermore, many of these requirements concern cost-related aspects of the NGO and do not pay attention to content-related work;

As the EIF is dependent on co-founding, NGOs stated that making a request for another fund can be very demanding and turn into a waste of time and resources if the demand for national co-funding is rejected.


Unlike Finland and Germany, Romania is a net exporter of migrants and considered a transit country by migrants: a place where they stay temporarily before moving to another EU member state. Because of this, the integration of third country nationals is not high on the Romanian political agenda and migrants and NGOs struggle with integration policies influenced by a national tradition that looks at migration as a security issue rather than a social one.

ROMANIA

Romania is not a popular destination for immigrants; on the contrary it is rather known for being a country of emigration. Its net migration rate in 2014 was negative, showing that the number of people leaving Romania is still higher than the number of people migrating to Romania.

During the communist era and the early years after the fall of the communist regime, the major push factors of emigration were the economic situation and the poor job prospects. Nowadays, Romania’s economic situation is still not attractive to labour migrants, explaining partly why most third country nationals who enter Romania are likely to leave again. They do not consider Romania as their final destination, but rather as a transit country to enter Western Europe.

However, immigration into Romania has slowly increased since 1991. For instance, from the end of 2005 until the end of 2006, the number of foreign citizens living in Romania rose from 45,900 to 48,200. With Romania’s accession to the EU in January 2007, the number of immigrants continued to grow and reached 102,800 in 2014 (among them 55,800 non-EU nationals).

Despite the increase, this figure is still relatively low compared to the total estimated Romanian population, which amounts to approximately 19,940,000 people.

Studies show that migrants come to Romania mainly for family reunification (42%) or study purposes (25.5%). In 2010 only 14% of migrants moved to Romania for job-related purposes. These trends are still valid in recent years. In terms of countries of origin, third country nationals in Romania are mostly from Moldova (13,300), Turkey (8,900) and China (6,900).

Concerning the perception of immigrants by civil society, Romanian nationals prove to be tolerant and admissive. Romanians have a relatively positive perception of immigrants. However, as to be expected, the highest level of tolerance is met in urban areas, among highly educated people. In culturally homogenous areas, the level of tolerance is significantly lower. The most frequently expressed fear among Romanian citizens in relation to immigrants is that they could take away jobs from Romanians by accepting lower wages.

At a political level, immigration and integration are not widely debated issues in Romania. In fact, they are hardly discussed at all by political parties. As it is an emigration country, the public discourse in Romania is dominated by questions on how to improve the image of Romanian citizens abroad and how to encourage return migration in order to address labour

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56 -0.24 migrant(s)/1000 in 2014. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Net migration rate Romania 2014, last accessed on: 19.03.2015.
63 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), op. cit.
66 ibidem.
shortages, in particular in the health sector. Another factor explaining the absence of political debate is that legislative texts related to migration and integration have not yet been put to the vote in Parliament.68

Moreover, immigrants are largely excluded from the national political system as illustrated by the score Romania received on the MIPEX composite indicator for political participation of immigrants in 2011. Out of 31 countries in Europe and North America, Romania got the lowest score. This ranking is explained by the fact that, in Romania, “non-EU residents cannot vote, cannot set up their own political association or join political parties and immigrant consultative bodies are absent”. Also, “apart from the right to create media, non-EU residents cannot become a part of democratic life”.69

At national level, the General Inspectorate for Immigration (under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) is in charge of integration policies. The government adopted a “National Strategy for Immigration”, covering the years 2007-2010,70 which was later renewed for the 2011-2014 period.71 This strategy is strongly focused on migration control.72 This can be explained by Romania’s strategic position at the external border of the EU (although not yet a Schengen area member). Also, prior to joining the EU, Romania’s immigration policy was underdeveloped due to the very limited number of immigrants in the 1990s. Therefore, its immigration policy was highly influenced by the European legislative framework, which is very focused on border control.

Another objective of the abovementioned strategy is the facilitation of legal, selected and therefore highly skilled economic immigration. Despite this, labour migration in Romania is still relatively low. In 2012, only 2,800 work authorisations were issued to foreign citizens: 700 for permanent workers, 700 for posted workers, 200 for athletes and 110 for highly skilled workers.73

While Romania is increasingly becoming a destination country for immigrants it is still primarily an emigration and a transit country for third country nationals whose final destination is western Europe. In 2012, 82.7% of immigrants in Romania were in possession of temporary residence permit, whereas 17.3% had a permanent residence permit.74

This characteristic of the migratory phenomenon in Romania has three main consequences. Firstly, as mentioned above, the immigration topic is absent from the public discourse and political debates. Secondly, the Romanian immigration policy is strongly influenced by the European legislation and the responsibilities Romanian authorities are acquiring in terms of the management of irregular migration and human trafficking (in view of joining the Schengen area). Thirdly, as immigration is not a political priority, the institutional and civil society settings dealing with immigration and integration are also underdeveloped.

In Romania only 15 NGOs are working with migrants, 11 of which are situated in the capital city, Bucharest. This explains also why between 2007 and 2013, Romania received only 1.03% of the overall budget allocated to the EIF (€8,518,896).75

INTERVIEWS AND SURVEY RESULTS

Number of survey respondents 37
Number of interviews with NGOs 2

General Observations

• NGOs mention a conflict of interest between the main goal of the Interior Ministry, i.e. security, and the mission of the NGOs, i.e. integration, and protection of migrants. In this regard, one NGO mentioned that the

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72 Bénédicte Michalon (2013), op. cit.
73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, op. cit.
Case studies - 22

• A quarter of the respondents are not able to recall the name of the programme they were involved in.

• 91% of the respondents are aware that the programmes are funded by the EU.

• Respondents moderately felt like EU citizens and shared the values of the EU (score 3.5 on a scale from 1 to 5).

• 91% of the respondents think that activities of the NGOs were compliant with the objectives of the programme they were involved in.

• Language classes are often mentioned as a point for further improvements in the EIF-funded programmes. Respondents mentioned that the number of available courses is too low and improvements in the EIF-funded programmes. Respondents also regretted that they were not free of charge.

• Half of the respondents have experienced verbal harassment, 33% have experienced physical attacks and 33% have experienced discrimination.

• The two interviewed NGOs reported that their work is hindered by a lot of unnecessary bureaucracy as a factor that undermines the efficiency of the integration programmes.

• According to the interviewed NGOs, programmes are too short (often shorter that one year) and many respondents felt that the programmes they participated in were understaffed. It is likely that participants of longer programmes would be more able to learn the local language.

• Many respondents consider that these programmes should be more accessible throughout the country, and not only in the big cities;

• NGOs believe that they should become more involved in the design of programmes so that they can better match it with the reality on the ground. To this end, the EU should take into account the knowledge and expertise of NGOs when defining its policies;

• Romanian NGOs mention that their annual budget is largely comprised of EIF funds.

Integration in the Host Society

• The majority of respondents (62.5%) consider Romania to be their home, although 47% of respondents still see themselves as a migrant;

• 28% of respondents eventually want to move back to their native country;

• 70% of respondents would like to integrate more into the Romanian society and respondents indicated that programmes aimed at labour market integration are lacking;

• Half of the respondents have experienced verbal harassment, 33% have experienced physical attacks and 33% have experienced discrimination;

• Language classes are often mentioned as a point for further improvements in the EIF-funded programmes. Respondents mentioned that the number of available courses is too low and regretted that they were not free of charge;

• Most of the respondents felt that the following actions would improve integration: improved advertising of existing initiatives/programmes, investing in programmes that promote a more tolerant and inclusive society, financing local NGOs that have direct contact with migrants, and having more EU top-level officials with a migration background.

Knowledge about the EU programmes and impact on European identity

• 87.5% of the respondents think that activities of the NGOs were easily accessible and mentioned that there were little to no barriers to immigrants wanting to join a program;

• Respondents moderately felt like EU citizens and shared the values of the EU (score 3.5 on a scale from 1 to 5);

• A quarter of the respondents are not able to recall the name of the programme they were involved in.

Migration and Integration just outside the EU borders

«Serbia is a transit country and in the migration sphere, it is still in the process of laying down the foundations of a comprehensive national policy. It is a new country when it comes to migration and integration and being an accession country, it could benefit from guidelines and funds from the EIF».

Darija Maric, FutureLabber

Procedures

• Currently, the EIF allocates a fixed yearly amount of money to EU member states for a duration of seven years. This fund is based on the number of immigrants that the respective country receives at the beginning of that seven-year period. The process of allocating EIF funds is therefore too rigid and cannot respond to unpredictable developments at global level as the events currently occurring in Ukraine, which have led to large numbers of Ukrainian refugees in Romania;

• One NGO explained that it is easier to receive EIF if you are part of a network. In this way more areas can be covered. In their case: a network made by four organisations covered not only four towns but the entire Romanian territory. “We were the single one able to provide Romanian language courses everywhere, also in towns where we do not have headquarters. This is good because it is quite difficult to reach immigrants in those towns otherwise”;

• The EIF plays an important role in running the activities of the two interviewed NGOs. One mentioned that during the funding period 2007-2013, around 95% of its budget was derived from the EIF and the other mentioned that almost all the staff was hired thanks to this funding;

• Nations that have only recently become target nations for immigrants, such as Romania, receive EIF funds according to the same standards and calculations as nations that have been an immigration target for a long time already. However, nations that are new immigration targets do not yet possess the extensive and efficient institutions needed to handle the flow of immigrants. Extra EIF funds would be an important resource necessary for setting up these institutions;

• The two interviewed NGOs reported that their work is hindered by a lot of unnecessary paperwork, consuming both time and resources. For instance, one NGO mentioned that “public officials administrating the EIF fund sometimes add useless conditions, for instance in the tender procedures, resulting in a lot of unnecessary paperwork”. Migrants also pointed out to unnecessary bureaucracy as a factor that undermines the efficiency of the integration programmes.

“I would like to migrate to a western EU country to improve my financial situation as I lost everything I worked for in Syria.”

A survey respondent from Syria living in Romania

Darija Maric, FutureLabber
Similarly to Germany and Finland, Spain is a net importer of migrants. It started experiencing large migration influxes since 2000 and it is the only country where integration falls under the competence of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, instead of under the competence of the Ministry of Interior. This difference does not only affect the Spanish government’s approach to integration policies but also the public debate on migration that appears to be less polarised than in Germany or Finland.

SPAIN

It is very difficult to determine migration trends in Spain in the 20th century as the Spanish National Statistics Institute only started to collect data on migrants in 2008. This was the result of the European law 862/2007, which established common rules for the collection and compilation of Community statistics on immigration to and emigration from the member state territories. Previous data of migration come from the national census, which offers unreliable information in this regard, or occasional statistics that have too many deficiencies.

The historical event that determined migration in terms of numbers during the 20th century is the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Roughly one million people emigrated to countries in South America, like Cuba, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico or countries in Europe, like France, fleeing from persecution under Franco’s regime. The Second World War did not trigger as many displacements as it did in other countries, but a lot of Spaniards moved to European countries like Switzerland, Germany, France, United Kingdom or Belgium after the war ended, to find a job. It has been estimated that between one and a half million and two million Spanish citizens moved out of the country. Until 1973 Spain was a country of emigration, but this situation changed radically. After the petroleum crisis, which was followed by an increase in unemployment in Spaniards’ destination countries and the accession of Spain to the EU, the country started to receive immigrants from Africa and South America (mainly from Morocco, Ecuador, Colombia, and Bolivia).

The economic boom of the early 2000s led to a rising demand for new workers. Most immigrants have come to search for employment or to accompany relatives who are migrant workers and filling vacancies in the labour market has been the government’s main justification when it comes to admitting immigrants. Asylum seekers and refugees, however, have represented a very minor percentage of immigrant flows. In overall terms, approximately 500,000 migrants per year arrived

78 INE National Institute of Statistics.
80 INE National Institute of Statistics.
81 Ibidem.
82 Ibidem.
between 2002 and 2007 and “Spain’s foreign-born population increased from less than 4% of the total population to almost 14%” between 2000 and 2009, making Spain the second-largest recipient of immigrants in absolute terms among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The major countries of origin are Morocco, Ecuador and Colombia, according to data available at the National Institute of Statistics (INE). In line with other EU countries, immigration in Spain is strongly characterised by third country nationals than by EU citizens. The economic crisis and the harsh consequences for the Spanish labour market have, however, significantly impacted migration trends in Spain. The country’s net migration rate turned from 599,074 in 2004 to -50,426 (estimated) in the first semester of 2014, making Spain an emigration country.

Despite the long immigration history of the country, there has not been a strong opposition against immigration in Spain (unlike in other European countries), not even amid the economic crisis that has hit the country so hard. This lack of an anti-immigration discourse is related to three main factors: a general belief among the Spanish population that immigration has contributed to economic growth, Spain’s political culture that sees immigration as a vehicle for expressing democratic values, and the heritage of the Franco dictatorship, discouraging public statements that could be considered discriminatory.

However, some commentators argue that Spanish attitudes and policies towards immigration and integration, which had been quite open and committed to integration until now, may take a turn in the direction of the rest of Europe in the near future. Due to the economic crisis and the increase of the jobless population, Spanish citizens no longer see the need for migrant workers. The recent landslide general election victory of the conservative Popular Party (PP) also points to a possible shift in the orientation of immigration policy, from one centred on integration to one focused on national security, where admission channels for labour migration were made narrower and the fight against illegal migration became a priority. One example that could support these statements is the new measure carried out by the Spanish Ministry for Home Affairs, which consisted of reintroducing blades on top of the fence at the Melilla border. These blades were removed in 2007 due to the tremendous injuries they were causing. However, they were put up again by the end of 2013 by the PP government.

When it comes to the integration of migrants, the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and the General Secretary of Immigration and Emigration are the responsible authorities. Spain has allocated €155,117,775 to the integration of migrants and received €98,438,312 from the EIF, which covered 39% of the total funding allocated to integration policies in Spain.

“The weaknesses of the EIF funded programme I took part in comes from the lack of awareness from society’s side about discriminatory situations.”

A survey respondent from Senegal living in Spain

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86 EUROSTAT, Demographic balance and crude rates, Net migration plus statistical adjustment, last accessed on 11.03.2015.
87 INE National Institute of Statistics, Migraciones exteriores desde 2008. Saldo migratorio con el extranjero por año, sexo y edad, last accessed on 08.03.2015.
89 Ibidem.
90 Ibidem.
INTERVIEWS AND SURVEY RESULTS

Number of survey respondents 48
Number of interviews with NGOs 4

General Observations
• Over half of the respondents (55%) stated that they are unemployed and therefore not included in the labour market;
• The majority of the respondents have lived in Spain for more than two years and around 45.2% of the respondents said they have been living in the country for 5 to 10 years;
• 57.1% of the respondents said that they consider Spain their home, rather than the country their parents or they themselves were born in. At the same time, 52.5% of the respondents say that they would like to go back to their country of origin;
• When asked about the main weaknesses of the programmes they attended, respondents mainly noted the brevity of the programme and the lack of economic support;
• One NGO noted that while EU integration policies are ‘adequate’ at EU level, they are not transferred effectively at the member state level as they often come into conflict with governments’ policies of the exclusion of third country nationals from services and society (such as exclusion from public health system and forced returns);
• When asked about the objectives of the EIF, one NGO responded that European and member states’ policies should be more harmonised in order to achieve the successful integration of migrants;
• According to one of the interviewed NGOs, migrants’ participation in decision-making should be facilitated.

Integration in the Host Country
• Little less than half of respondents (47%) said that they and their family members have experienced some sort of discrimination, with 60% saying that they have been discriminated in the access to services;
• Only half of the respondents said that they feel included in the Spanish society and only 44% said that they feel that their civil rights are respected;
• Only about 53% of the respondents said that they want to integrate in the Spanish society and only one third answered that they identify with the values of the EU or consider themselves citizens of the European Union;
• When asked if they perceive their culture of origin as a challenge to integrate in Spain in terms of making friends, getting access to public services, getting a job or having their voice represented by the political elite, the two latter emerged as the most problematic, with 30% and 39% of respondents, respectively, experiencing problems in those spheres.

Knowledge about the EU programmes and impact on European identity
• An overwhelming majority (96%) of respondents said that the programme they participated in was easily accessible;
• Almost all respondents knew about the name and objectives of the programmes that they attended, but only 63.3% knew that the programme was financed by the EU;
• Over half of respondents (65.52%) said they were totally satisfied with the project they attended;
• 92.6% of the respondents said that the EU should play a role in fostering the integration of young adults with a migration background, especially by financing local NGOs who have a direct contact with migrants and are more aware about local problems (80.8%) and by better advertising existing initiatives/programmes (73.1%);
• One NGO noted that while the EIF covers only 1% of its budget, it plays a very important role because it funds awareness campaigns that no one else would finance.

Procedures
• According to one NGO, EU integration policies should be complemented with the implementation of EU development cooperation policies;
• One NGO stated that they would like the EU/EIF to review their activities in order to advise them on how to improve the programmes they are carrying out;
• One NGO said that they are happy with the functioning of the EIF but migrants without residence permits should be included as beneficiaries as well.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU

Policy orientations

• In several EU countries, immigration falls under the competences of the Interior Ministry, which might result in a conflict of interest between security and integration policies as highlighted in the Romanian case study. Such conflict of interest is likely to undermine the work of NGOs. It is therefore important to ensure that the mission of the NGOs working on the integration of migrants is supported by national institutions. The EU should pay more attention to this aspect when allocating funds to member states.

• More coherence between migration and integration policies at the European level. At the moment, migration and integration policies are dealt with separately and are addressed in silos, whereas they are strongly interconnected in reality. While the EU has a competence to deal with migration and asylum policies, integration remains primarily the responsibility of member states. Integration policies are needed at a very early stage, as the first experiences of migrants on the EU territory can have a significant effect on their further capacity and willingness to integrate. Therefore, integration aspects in EU migration policies should be reinforced and the EU should also support integration measures in transit countries.

• Accompany integration measures with cooperation with third countries. Special efforts should be made to facilitate the integration of migrants in the labour market. To this end, the EU should make progress regarding the recognition of diploma and professional qualifications with third countries.

Funding allocations

• Priority to NGOs who have a European network. In order to strengthen the European perspective of national integration policies, the new instrument replacing the EIF – the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – should promote and favour NGOs with a strong network (at a national and European level) but also those who have a good understanding of the reality on the ground and a direct connection with migrants.

• Introduce more flexibility with regard to co-funding. Depending on the budget allocated to integration policies at the national level, some NGOs might face difficulties in getting national co-funding. Furthermore, accessing funding is more difficult for NGOs with a strong grassroots aspect and located outside of big cities. Supporting the work of such organisations is also crucial. To this end, the EU should consider funding certain projects 100%. This might ease bureaucracy and encourage more applications from NGOs that work on a volunteer-basis (without paid staff).

• Faster, more flexible procedures. The process of allocating EIF funds to member states should become more flexible, so that it can quickly respond to unpredictable migration influxes in case of unexpected global events.

• More funding, more visibility. Funding allocated to the integration of migrants is generally too limited and lacks visibility at the EU level. A stronger integration of such measures in EU migration policy should also translate into more funding.

• Investment in institutional capacity. Migration trends are changing over time; emigration countries can sometimes become immigration countries. In general, such countries do not have well-developed integration policies. More attention should be paid to reinforce the institutional capacity in those countries in order to help them build the institutions needed to handle the flow of immigrants.

• Ensure continuity through long projects. Long projects, even over two financing periods, should receive preference when it comes to the selection of eligible projects. Otherwise, important work already conducted and the gained expertise will get lost.
Administrative Procedures and Requirements

- **Lighten bureaucratic procedures.** The majority of interviewed NGOs reported an excessive workload created by the EIF’s administrative requirements. The nature of EIF-projects involves a lot of human interaction besides the fulfilment of administrative tasks, and priority should be given to the former. The EU should lessen the weight of the EIF’s bureaucratic procedures so that NGOs’ staff can concentrate on actual activities with the migrants.

- **Transparent evaluation.** The EU should maintain (also for transparency reasons) an open and well-structured evaluation process and include the following evaluation criteria: sustainability and feedback of the project’s participants. The voice of migrants needs to be taken into account in the evaluation as well.

Content of programmes

- **Offer guidelines for the implementation of projects and favour language classes, schools and free time activities.** The EU should fund projects dealing with integration more directly, especially those that address work with mixed groups (migrants and non-migrants, FutureLab for migrants for instance). The projects should involve schools, as they are the place where migrants and non-migrants and their parents get together. Priority should also be given to projects that offer free time activities (such as art and cultural activities), as they offer a platform for free expression and exchanges.

- **Reinforce the youth dimension.** Many migrants are young people who are hoping to become an integrated part of the host society. The success of their integration process can have a significant impact on the host country, both socially and economically. Developing programmes directed specifically toward young migrants are therefore of utmost importance for the future of Europe.

- **Facilitate a fair labour market integration.** In order to address the prevailing unemployment among migrants and avoid discrimination on the labour market, EU-funded projects should favour legal counselling so that migrants are better aware of their rights. In addition, projects advising on CV designs and job interviews should be developed.

- **Create EU-wide projects fostering EU identity.** Projects that foster mutual understanding and exchanges with other young immigrants from different EU-states forges a common sense of belonging. In other words, there should be more projects that involve several EU countries and bring together young immigrants from different parts of the EU, as a means to create a European identity among the migrants community.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO NATIONAL & REGIONAL AUTHORITIES

Requirements on projects’ beneficiaries

- **Introduce and expand the criteria for beneficiaries.** Interviews with NGOs from Germany, Spain and Romania revealed that the criteria determining the eligibility criteria of EIF-funded programmes beneficiaries are often too narrow. In some countries, migrants without residence permits are not eligible as beneficiaries. In others, people who are married to a citizen of the host country receive the nationality of their spouses and are therefore excluded from some programmes. Member states should make sure that eligibility criteria are flexible enough and that different types of programmes are offered to respond to the needs that people with a migration background (not only foreigners) might have in the long course of their integration process.
Outreach

- **Better communication.** Governments and different national agencies should support NGOs in marketing their projects. Most respondents clearly felt that there is little information about the projects;

- **Creating mutual trust between integration workers and migrants.** In some countries such as Germany, NGOs have to check the residence permits of migrants in order to allow them to participate in some programmes. Such rules on checking migrants’ residence permits should be changed so that migrants do not associate integration workers with police and security services.

Policy content

- **Offer the tools for civic and democratic participation.** In many countries, migrants are excluded from the political system and are not involved in civic organisations. Young immigrants are particularly prone to radicalisation due to social exclusion that is often caused by stigmatisation and a lack of belonging. Member states should make sure that young migrants are empowered and should allow their voice to be heard in civil society organisations and in the decision-making processes. Making them an active agent in society is the only way to avoid radicalisation. There are many good examples at the local level, such as training on civic society, meetings with local deputes, excursions to city hall etc. Such examples should be further developed.

- **Promote the involvement of the host society in integration efforts.** Integration is unsuccessful without the participation and support of the ‘native’ population and hence it is recommended to implement projects that involve non-immigrants as well, to enhance further integration. Projects such as art activities, cooking classes etc. can allow immigrants and non-immigrants to meet each other in a friendly setting.

"Through sharing food, music, literature and other forms of cultural exchanges we make our cultures more diverse and open-minded."

A survey respondent living in Finland
RECOMMENDATIONS TO NGOs AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Outreach
• **Easy to reach and accessible.** NGOs need to make sure that their offices are easily accessible to migrants at a local level and should advertise already existing projects better. Their offices should furthermore be located close to the migrants’ accommodation, or in central places of a city. They should also advertise their programmes in several languages.

Content
• **More frequent use of culture and arts to promote integration.** Arts have the potential to integrate immigrants in ways that traditional projects cannot.
• **Involve migrants as project leaders.** More projects dealing with the integration of third country nationals should prepare and encourage migrants to become project leaders as they are often the most appropriate persons who can help other migrants to understand both the culture of the country of origin and of the host country. They are well-placed to provide adequate support as they know the situation the migrant is facing and can therefore easily identify his/her needs.

Partnership
• **Fostering exchange of best practices among NGOs.** Some projects run by NGOs are more successful than others. Integration workers should build partnerships with other NGOs (also located in other member states) so that they can learn from each other.

“EU funded programmes could be improved via regular meetings among NGO representatives, public authorities and migrants who benefit from them.”

A survey respondent from Moldova living in Romania

“There is a need for multicultural related programmes such as singing, dancing, and instrument playing to identify and utilise the diverse and rich cultures of immigrants. There is a need for radio programmes that enable immigrants to learn, freely discuss and air their views on immigrants’ issues, to help authorities and political parties understand the channels to assist in decision-making”.

A respondent from Liberia living in Finland
This study shows that EU member states’ experience with migration influxes and integration policies varies greatly. Finland, Germany, Romania and Spain differ on a number of aspects, from the national authorities in charge of integration – the Ministry of Interior in Finland, Germany and Romania and the Ministry of Social Affairs in Spain –, to the number of third country nationals living in their territory – making up 1.52% of the population in Germany, compared to 0.28% in Romania –, to each government’s commitment and responsiveness to integration.

Some countries have been trying to attract immigrants as early as the 1950s, while others only started receiving migrants in recent years. While Germany has established mandatory pre-entry integration programmes in third countries, Romania is still working to put in place a solid infrastructure for the reception and integration of third country nationals. In the face of this mosaic of differences, the EU should play a more active role, promoting the exchange of best practices between EU member states and allocating extra funds to the countries who are still developing their integration policies and infrastructures. Even more importantly, the EU should include an integration element in its migration policy and increase its role in integration policies across the continent. At the moment, the EU contributes only a small part to integration policies at the national level, but the results of this study show that there is room for the EU to positively influence EU member states’ integration practices.

The replacement of the EIF with the European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) for the financing period 2014-2020 is certainly a step in the right direction. The reduction of six existing EU funds to two funds is not only likely to help diminish the negative effects of the division of competences between the EU – in charge of migration – and the member states – in charge of integration –, but also to help provide the bureaucratic simplification and increased flexibility that the majority of the NGOs interviewed in this study called for.

Despite these advancements, some questions remain unanswered. Migration policy will remain an EU competence and integration policies will continue to be a responsibility of individual EU member states in the foreseeable future. Many of the migrants of today will be the EU citizens of tomorrow and it is of the utmost importance that the EU and its member states work together to device coherent, coordinated and successful integration and migration strategies so that current and future EU citizens will be full and equal members of European society.

CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION

The body of this report was written by Jorge Fernandez Gomez, Fiona Fritz, Sandra Kuna, Rina Kuusipalo, Carolina Seminario Herrera, Nitin Sood and Michelle Steenvoorden. They also carried out the analysis of the survey results, which forms the basis for this publication. All of them are participants of FutureLab Europe (FLE) 2014.

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Europe has to be a “citizen project” in order to succeed. It needs fresh ideas and innovative concepts as well as a strong supportive base from its younger generations. In order to enable FutureLab Europe to exist and develop, ten European Foundations, with the help of the Network of European Foundations and the European Policy Centre in Brussels, joined forces. They are assembling experiences, resources and – most of all – their outstanding Alumni. The programme currently has 85 participants coming from 28 countries – EU countries as well as non-EU countries.

FutureLab Europe empowers young voices mainly on the topics of democracy and participation, equal opportunities on the labour market, and European identity. Participants of FutureLab Europe develop their own ideas and positions on matters of European relevance and take responsibility and actions in order to help build the Europe of the future. They share their young perspective on Europe through their blogs, in public debates and through their individual projects.
FutureLab Europe is a project of the European Alliance for Democratic Citizenship, affiliated to the Network of European Foundations and initiated by the Körber Foundation. It is operated by the European Policy Centre.

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